

Minton Beddoes: It's great to be here again for another really uplifting subjects where the West lost its way. Um, uh, it strikes me that 30 years ago in 1999 and you probably read this, uh, a essay was published in the summer, so you have the national interest. Why then relatively unknown academic, Frank Fukuyama, um, declaring with a question mark that everybody has forgotten the end of history. Uh, and it was, I think probably one of the, uh, most, um, Kara could shored political science, I say as of recent time, but in it he argued that the west was witnessing, uh, the world was witnessing the triumph of the West. And I just wanted to quote you, he would've said, we were seeing the quote universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Well, that didn't age all that well that years later. Um, at least for the moment it didn't.

Minton Beddoes: 30 years later, uh, we see that the world riving power is an increasingly or authoritarian dictatorship. In China. We see growing ethnic nationalism, growing backlash against globalization majority's of people in many Western democracies. A majority of people think their children will be worse off than they were. And we're seeing the u s now following a policy of America first, the hedge amount of the post 45 year order world order no longer, at least to those of us outside the US as committed to that world order as it used to be. So I think it's reasonable to ask the question, has the West lost its way? And really to try and answer that in two ways. Kind of what happened? Was it who breasts? Was it in competence? Was it domestic problems? Was it international problems? Was it foreign policy? Was it economic mistakes? And I'd like this distinguished panel to, to discuss that though then I think, um, so at the, we don't all end the morning in a kind of fit of depression.

Minton Beddoes: We should look forward, uh, and talk a little bit about how to fix this. Um, and what do we do going forward and is the West still a meaningful concept? And if it is, what do we do to make sure that the west doesn't lose its way going forward? And to have that conversation, I couldn't think of a better group of people. And I'm going to go from your left to my right, uh, on your far left. Doug Lute, president of Cambridge Global Advisors, senior fellow at Harvard. But most importantly for this conversation, former US ambassador to NATO. Welcome Kori Schake to his in the middle. Korea is deputy director of the Institute for International of Strategic Studies. She is author of a number of books including safe passage, which is an excellent book on the successful shift of power from the British hedging, one of the 19th century to the u s of the 20th, which she points out rather worrying me as the only case in history where this happened.

Minton Beddoes: And she was John McCain's foreign policy advisor in 2008 welcome. And here John Judas, a author and journalist of, uh, I think eight books. Um, the most recent one is the nationalist revival before he wrote about populism. And he's just told me his new book is about socialism. It tells you which way the world is going. I'm welcome to you too. Uh, let's start by, um, getting all of your perspectives on what happened. How did we get from the euphoria of the 1989,

the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dawn of the period of us unipolarity us hegemony Frank Fukuyama's world to where we are today. Let's start with you Doug,

Douglas Lute: well, I think frank was onto something with regard to 1989. I see the period 89 to 91 as an historic inflection point because a number of key things happen. 89 itself featured the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was a forerunner to the failure of the Russians, the Soviet state. Um, it featured, uh, the fall of the Berlin Wall and Tiananmen Square and all of these three, uh, were sort of four runners or forebodings of what was to follow in the decade of, of the 90s. Uh, within quick succession. I mean, a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, you had the reunification of Germany. Who would've thought I was commissioned as a second lieutenant and went in the height of the Cold War to the Inter German border. No one imagined in the American military structure or the national security structure, uh, that you'd see the reunification of Germany probably in our lifetimes. And yet it happened like that.

Douglas Lute: Um, and then the rest of the 90s featured a period as frank described in his, in his article, uh, where things just seem to go our way. The Gulf War, uh, 90 91, Short, fast successful, quick in, out, done, right. Uh, the intervention in Bosnia in 95 took us a while to get into Bosnia, but once we were there, no casualties, the fighting stopped, sort of put the state together in the, in the form of dating and so forth. Uh, at NATO, the 90s featured up a bit of drift actually. Uh, and wondering whether NATO, right, what's going to happen to this alliance that was created to, uh, counter the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union, uh, dissolve. And then, um, also in the 90s, the beginning of a very aggressive period of NATO enlargement. So adding states from the 16 members, states of NATO when the wall fell in 89 to now, um, soon, 30 states up.

Douglas Lute: So all that happened in the 90 and when you add that up now with two decades of sort of retrospective, um, uh, perspective, uh, I think the nineties were largely up to easy led to a sense of complacency and maybe drift in inattention with regard to America's role in the world and the international institutions that had served us so well. I'll just quickly add that that decade of inattention in my view was followed by the thousand and a decade of overreach and Hubris and we can come back to that. But I think just the combination of these two successive decades that brought us the kind of a position we're in today

Kori Schake: in attention in the 90s who Brits in the two thousands. Kori, do you agree with that? And I mean that's the, the argument that it was Hubris is one that you hear a lot of, you know, the US was the super power, the sole superpower, and it just became who boosted. Yeah, I basically agree with that. I see the original sin of how the West lost its way was believing we won the Cold War. And instead of celebrating that the people of the Soviet Union and the people of states living under Soviet dominion actually won the Cold War change, especially change from a repressive society where people don't have responsibility for their own outcomes. To add the burgeoning kick Hafeni of Western society is really hard. And thinking that, that we did this instead of they

did this. I think it's the origin of the, uh, of the Hubris. I would say two other things though.

Kori Schake: One is I still think Frank Fukuyama's right? Um, that we have lost our belief that our values are universal. That people everywhere strive for the liberties that we have. And you know, the people who don't believe who, who believe that our values are universal, the Chinese Communist Party believes our values are universal. That's why they are building such a repressive surveillance state because they think the people of China want what we have and that's not in their interests. Um, so, uh, I think that timeline on Frank is still running and I think he's going to prove right that, that hey, go, which is the origin of Frank's argument. Hagle believe that as people become more prosperous, they become more demanding political consumers. And that that's the dynamic that drives liberal societies to be prosperous and stable. And I think that's fundamentally right. That's a really important point. And we're going to get back to whether it's just a question of, of whether, you know, there's a blip in, in the Fukuyama view and it's going to, we're going to get that over overtime.

Minton Beddoes: But I think what is suddenly right is that in 1989 we did not expect the Chinese state to evolve in the way that it has evolved and is worth remembering. That Teneman square was also in 1989, uh, it happened, I think just after his essay had gone to press or just about the same time. And I think if you look back from now 10 and men was actually more indicative of what Ha, what the world looked like 30 years later than the fall of the Berlin Wall. And as we go to China, um, John, I want your perspective on what was the, was it who breasts was it, overreach it something else. And then we'll start dividing into foreign policy and economic.

John Judis: Okay. Um, my, my view is that, um, we had a number of great successes in the world, Europe, uh, after World War Two, uh, the end of the Cold War internet boom and the United States in the 90s. And that we embarked upon a number of projects. Uh, it really in Europe beginning in the a late eighties, nineties in the United States going to about 2003, uh, that were Utopian in nature that, uh, that had hopes attached to them that were not going to be fulfilled expansion of NATO. Um, again, that it wouldn't ruffle the Russian fe, uh, uh, w it w w it wouldn't, uh, we could do it without reviving in any sense. Yeah. American, Russian hostilities, uh, the EU, uh, the, uh, adoption of the euro 1992, 1993 that you've had this kind of convergence between Germany and Spain where everybody would become a prosperous, uh, the single market.

John Judis: The idea that people could move wherever they wanted within the eurozone without, uh, again, rough ruffling feathers, United States, um, particularly again with regards to China and the WTO. This idea that, and if you go back to 1999 to 2002 and read the kind of statements that people were making about what to expect from China going into the WTO trade surplus for America by the early two thousands liberal democracy in China. Well, you know, would take a decade or two. Uh, but, uh, we, we wouldn't have anything like what we have now. So,

uh, United States, again, just the last thing again, deregulation of finance. Uh, the idea that we could have a kind of Adam Smith world, uh, deregulated with free trade and capital moving wherever it wants an enormous amounts of immigrants coming into the country and nothing would happen. So it all blew up. And, uh, the result of that is again, a lot of right wing populism, some populism on the left, Donald Trump, marine le pen, you said. And I, from my standpoint, uh, Trump is a kind of early warning signal to the world in the United States. And you know, you can put Brexit in the pen in the alternative for Deutschland in the same, uh, category, uh, that something's really wrong and that we have to get things right.

Minton Beddoes: Okay. You have, you've raised a lot of along charge sheet here. Um, and I feel so compelled as the editor of a newspaper that was founded to champion free trade in 1843 that, uh, it's, it's um, it's merit started long before 1989 and it's still a worthwhile doing. But anyway, we'll get through to those. Let's go through your charges cause actually it's the useful organizer for the rest of the conversation. The expansion of NATO. Um, Doug, very close to what you did. Uh, was it a mistake?

Douglas Lute: Uh, I think it was mistake on two counts. Uh, first of all, I think we under appreciated the impact this would have on the really strategic move in Europe for stability in Europe, which you just NATO in the u s and its relationship with Russia. Uh, I think we discounted this and we thought, uh, that, uh, with Gorbachev and then Yeltsin of that this was a new Russia and we discounted what you might call the political DNA of Russia, which is, uh, fundamentally, uh, a vulnerable, suspicious state, which had been invaded any number of times, um, and um, and needed a reassurance that this wasn't going to happen again. So I think there was a mistake on that front. We underappreciated. Um, uh, Russia. The second part though was more internal. I think we underappreciated the ability of the hundred million Europeans in central new eastern Europe who were, who made up these new members of NATO to convert quickly and successfully to democracy and free open markets and so forth.

Douglas Lute: Um, and while the NATO Treaty says any state in Europe can join, if it adheres to the principles of the alliance. So democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law, you know, we didn't pay a lot of attention to those three qualities. Uh, as we, as we brought ally, as we brought new allies on board, and it's those same allies now where we see drift from these democratic values at the sort of 20 year mark. So, uh, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, uh, which were the first three post Cold War, uh, entrance into the alliance are now also showing signs of drift. Okay. But

Minton Beddoes: can I push back a bit on this? I iced my first job, my first adult job was in Poland working for the new solidarity government and I, it was very strong then the feeling that Poland was able, having shaken off the yolk of communism to return to its rightful place in Europe and the membership of NATO was an enormously powerful signal that it belonged to the west. So I wanted to know

it's, and I absolutely take your point, but it wasn't really a mistake and could one really have said to these countries, sorry. No, you know, it's just the copy part of this club. You go live under Soviet dominion and they, the counterfactual on NATO expansion is the important one. What do you think Poland would be if it had not had the assurance that we would help them defend their liberty and that they, that people have rights and they loan them in limited ways to government and that live that the Russian state does not deserve a sphere of influence that gets to determine whether Poland is stable, whether Poland is prosperous, whether Poland has a right to its independence.

Kori Schake: And we did it slowly. Um, we didn't do it fast. I was working for General Powell when we came up with a partnership for peace. We didn't station Western troops in those countries until Russia changed. So, um, we need to break ourselves free of believing. We are responsible for the choices that Russia made. And what Russia wanted was a Poland that was subservient, that wasn't independent, that wasn't western, that wasn't prosperous. If you look at what Russia has done in Ukraine, that's how to think about what Russia would have done in western Europe if we hadn't reached out and helped stabilized countries that were making an incredibly brave set of choices and agreed it's hard. Um, but they also actually deserve our help and support to do what they want it to be.

Douglas Lute: So let me just come back quickly on that. So I'm not suggesting that we should not have enlarged on suggesting that as we enlarged, right. We should have paid more attention and, and better appreciated the impact it was going to have on Russia because fundamentally the big strategic relationship that counts in Europe is Russia's relationship with the West, not the security of Chuck's Wacky or pole. Right? It's the bipolar relationship, which was always going to be the power relationship that counted. So we should have paid more attention to that. And then as we enlarged, we should have held, uh, in a very attentive way, sustained focus on the democracy and the institution building that undergirds a successful transition from what Poland was to what Poland can be. And I think we didn't fully do that. We welcomed them into the alliance. That's good news. Um, but then we sort of didn't pay much attention and some of those institutions have not held up. Well.

Minton Beddoes: Let's see. I'm just going down your list because you, you mentioned the EU, uh, you mentioned that you use adoption of the euro, which I, I have to say I have a, I have a hard time seeing why that is a driver of the decline of the West. But, but let's, let's take European Union more broadly. Cause the counterpart to Ede, NATO expansion was EU expansion. Do you think EU expansion was a mistake?

John Judis: Oh, you know, it's hard to do these kinds of counterparts. That's why I think that I'm sort of with the fat and the Thatcher, the goal line, I think customs union made a lot of sense, a foreign policy. Uh, when you get to the euro, there were a lot of, uh, the, there were a lot of criticisms made at night, early nineties of it. Uh, and a lot of them had to do with the economics and the ability of countries

to dig value, the ability of, of countries to control their own economies. Uh, and again, uh, the promise was that we wouldn't, we wouldn't have in Europe this kind of incredible divergence, but that the countries would be, their economies would become more similar. But instead you've got a system where Germany makes out like bandits in terms of their exports and where a lot of unteach other countries were alive for a wall prosper and become prosperous, uh, by, uh, creating huge debts from the surplus that Germany creates. And then it all blows up in 2008. So I think that, um, I think that you might've had, uh, a, a euro, a common currency, let's say among the original six or something like that. But I don't think the project is work. On the other hand, if you asked me what to do now, we'll get that. That's a total, that's a total,

Minton Beddoes: well, we'll get that. Although I think it's worth pointing out that not withstanding everything that's happened, pop the majority's in, in all the eurozone countries are in favor of keeping the euro. And that actually one could argue the European Union membership has probably been the one thing that has prevented the current governments upvoted at Hungary going kind of even more off the deep end so that, but let's, let's leave those students leave the nineties and they don't have the Europe, the, the, but they're in the European Union. The project centered currency. Yeah. But that we were talking about earlier about explain in your opinion to the, um, the, the, let's go to the two thousands where I think certainly there was an argument that the charge of Hubris is more, uh, apps. So Iraq to Afghanistan, the notion that because of the universe, the u s is view in the universality of its values, it should jolly well go in and you know, I'll bring other countries by force to this wonderful universal value that the US has going.

Kori Schake: What'd you think of that? That's not my recollection of why we fought the Iraq war. My recollection of why we fought the Iraq war was that a government that not only had chemical weapons, that not only use them on the Iranians in their eight year long war, use them on their own population, that we were very worried still after September 11th about the vulnerability of our country and that we had had continuous military operations going on in Iraq for 15 years that were contested almost daily by Iraq. And the sanctions regime that held Iraq in place was rapidly corroding. Was it with hindsight? I agree. I'm a mistake. Oh yeah. And was it a driver of the sense that the West has lost its way? Was it right? Pivotal? I think the 2008 financial crisis and the Iraq war are the two seminal moments in which we made a set of choices or created a set of conditions where we got, we not only got bad outcomes for ourselves, but we called into question our fundamental judgment about our ability, both my mom's opinion and also the Chinese Communist Party's opinion about where we are. She's not unrelated out, she's not a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

Minton Beddoes: And was that a, am I going to ask you the same in a second? Sorry. Was that the cause of incall friends? Was that incompetent execution or was it a failure to explain domestically to your mom and to others what the US was doing? It was

a bad decision to take in the first place and then badly managed for a decade subsequently, both by the Bush administration and by the Obama administration choices of, uh, overreach and choices of reticence. Uh, we're both to blame. I do not think we failed to explain ourselves to the American public. I think we made a bad set of decisions because we were fearful and didn't see better options and those decisions are going to cast a really long shadow about our judgment and they should. Do you agree that it was a bad set of decisions and you agree that it was driven by Phil? Was it driven by Hooper's?

Douglas Lute: So I think it was a dangerous blend of those two ingredients. [inaudible] it was fundamentally bad intelligence. This is not the first time we've had significant intelligence failures on big national security issues in the United States. I mean we didn't predict nine 11. Um, we didn't do well with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and, and beyond. Um, but it was fundamentally as an active duty military officer at that time was fundamentally really poor execution as well. I mean, we spent from 2003 when we went into Iraq, Baghdad fell not long after that. We spent a couple years debating among ourselves whether this was an insurgency or not. And you can remember the fundamental missteps of disbanding the Iraqi security forces. Uh, and then deep bath effication which essentially, uh, placed on the unemployment rolls, all competent civil servants in the Iraqi governmental structures at those two steps in particular for me, the, the benchmarks and then competence, I mean, this is, this is what really ignited the insurgency and really spelled, uh, the sort of conflict we had for the next 10 years. So it was, there's a heavy dose of incompetence. Um,

Minton Beddoes: John, what about the economic side, the importance of 2008, you've all mentioned that the 2008 financial crisis as being another big driver of the sense that the West had gotten wrong. How, how do you think the economic was as important as the foreign policy and why do you think it was so did it expose this of in competence of, of technocracy? What was the, what was the reason that was so seminal?

John Judis: Well, I mean it was, it was the biggest economic crash in cats. It's 1930s, and it reshuffled a lot of things. And, uh, one of the things that it exposed w uh, in both the United States in western Europe was the kind of uneven development that had been occurring over 20 or 30 years. Um, me, you know, again, re British used the term left behind. That's where it really originates from. But boy, where in the United States we had a private, enormous prosperity in these metro areas. And we and other areas were becoming, uh, the depopulated deindustrialized. Uh, same thing in, in, uh, the UK. Same thing in Europe. And, uh, again, these things were brought to the surface really and dramatized by the, uh, by, by the great recession. And to a great extent, we still haven't resolved those, those kinds of things. And again, if you want to look at the rise of Trump and the pen and etc, uh, you have to look right there and you have to look at those areas in the United States or Britain or France or you know, the former East Germany and sounds outside of all of the Ghana.

John Judis: That's where it all is. That's where it begins. And so we end, you know, so it's a question of how do we deal with this? I need uneven. The development of capitalism.

Minton Beddoes: That's a really interesting point. And it's, it's, it's, it's was exposed by 2008, but it'd been happening a long time before there's widening in equality. The sense that the globalized world was benefiting an elite few, a large,

John Judis: no, you have a combination of automation. The United States, you have that. Plus you have good China and the China trade, what the estimate? 2.4 million jobs lost in the early two thousands, uh, industrial jobs in places like Ohio, Michigan, uh, again, North Carolina furniture industry, all areas that went for Trump in 2016. So there you go.

Minton Beddoes: Well, that, that then gets, I think to an another broad part of this, which is did we make a mistake in how we dealt with China and was the decision to integrate China into, uh, the world economy effectively sort of epitomized by its entry into the WTO in 2000? Was that a mistake? And I, that's becoming an increasingly popular view, Cory. So I think it was a mistake, uh, for all the right kind of liberal reasons. If you go back and look at when the, the term the rules based international order comes into usage, it comes your search by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton when they are bringing China into the World Trade Organization. And the problem wasn't bringing them in. The problem was that we didn't have, we didn't require them to play by the rules that everybody else played by, um, that we were carrying them in. And as they grew more prosperous because our fundamental belief was as they grew more prosperous, they would grow more liberal and therefore, uh, they could abide by the rules eventually. And I think that created advantageous circumstances for China. And it also incentivize that continued authoritarianism in the country,

Douglas Lute: the ground here with, you know, in the 90s we sort of imagined the Russia that we wanted, that we desired. Right? It was an image. It's a little bit replayed with it. We imagined the China that we wanted China to be and it turns out that's not the China we had. And it was not the Russia that we had. And we're dealing now with a long period of time where we lived in this period of hope and dreams as opposed to the reality of China and Russia as they really are.

Kori Schake: I mostly agree with that, except you shouldn't underestimate that both Russia and China have changed. They made a set of choices. This wasn't an inevitable path. They made a set of choices that have made them more antagonistic, that, um, expressed a lack of confidence that they could prosper by the rules of the liberal order.

Douglas Lute: But in each case, they reverted back to what might be argued to be there. They're historic

Minton Beddoes: but, but isn't a DNA. Yeah.



John Judis: Yeah. I mean, that's what I will, again, countries make choices, but they make choices within their history. Um, well, when I went to Hungary, when I was doing the nationalism book, and if you go in the national museum there, which is again controlled by the government, it's not like, you know, here where you have private museums and the national history museum, there's like three rooms of the cod are, you know, the communists in the 1980s and there's like this little niche where you have the Hungarian revolution. Uh, and if you, again, if you see the kind of rewriting of history there, they're going very much back to the 1980s or the 1920s, um, Poland, similar thing is happening again, again, Russia. So all these countries, I mean they changed, but they changed within his, within a historical framework that sometimes goes back centuries.

Minton Beddoes: I'm gonna resist, I'm going to stick to my moderator role. Resist the temptation to completely disagree with you. Let's, let's move on cause I want to get us to look forward a bit before opening two questions. Um, what had, what do we do to fix it? You've all been to just briefly summarize. I think you all basically agree that, uh, there was Hubris that we did get some things wrong, particularly China. Um, and in the way that NATO was expanded and the 2008 financial crisis was it exposed. They have a lot of sort of domestic things that had gone wrong. So we, we are where we are now. Um, what do we, is the west still a meaningful term and what do we do to fix the west?

Douglas Lute: Doug? So I think in times of crisis like this, right, I think we are in a period of crisis, right? That it's fundamental to go back to the basics, right? And the basics for the institutions of the world order that served us well from 45 to the inflection point 89 91. Right? Um, we're values based institutions and, and I think we've made point here, the panel that we, we sorta didn't pay much attention in some of those values. We drifted, right? And I think now if we want to revert back to a norm, um, we need to revitalize those institutions and we need to start that revitalization with a deeper appreciation and more attention to values. So, you know, NATO is closest to me, right? But democracy, individual liberty and rule of law or in the second sentence of the Washington Treaty, the NATO treaty.

Douglas Lute: And if you look at how we're doing, if you look at Freedom House data, for example, across the 28, 29, soon to be 30 democracies of NATO, what you see over the last two decades is a steady decline across democratic values. So in the, that's a case, but we also need to go back to the values of the WTO. I mean, if the WTO has its standards and has its rules, then they should apply to everyone. And we drifted from that and we gave, we gave China a pass and we're paying the price. So back to values

Kori Schake: whether you agree with that and, and if so, isn't president Trump, right? Uh, president Trump is right about some things to answer your question about whether the west is still a meaningful concept. Yes, it absolutely is. Uh, for a couple of reasons. First, the value reasons that Doug mentioned, we actually do care about free societies and individual liberty, um, and protecting it where it

exists and helping expand it where people are brave enough to try and earn it for themselves actually does make the international order more stable, more prosperous and more, um, aligned to, uh, it makes the world safer for America and its friends. Second reason to, uh, think the West is still a meaningful concept is that at a time where the United States is not a great, we're not playing team sports. Well, we're not advancing democracy. The other liberal societies are Japan, Australia and India are banding together to create an investment fund to challenge the belt or to compete with the belt and road that has transparency and the rule of law and the kinds of good western standards that we care about. Uh, Britain, France and Australia are doing freedom of navigation patrols in the south China Sea. Our friends are stepping forward in a way that's advantageous to us and we should celebrate it and acknowledge it and play team sports because especially if China continues to rise, I continues to be authoritarian and predatory. We are going to need the help of our friends in the West to get there. John, what do you think? What's, what's the way to fix this?

John Judis: Well, look, and I'm not a policy person, so it's a hard on Jono, but they're not recommending what people should do. I had enough trouble that create a revolution in the 60s, you know, um, the, uh, look, I mean, Japan, South Korea, these are all important countries and we have to, I mean, you know, the United States is turning economically toward the Pacific. So it's, it's hard to conceptualize thing for me in terms of the West, we, we can talk about it in advance kind of capitalism and democracy and attempting to spread that. And, you know, and I think again, still that something like that is the answer to a more Pacific world, Pacific and, and prosperous world. Uh, so you know, how we do that? Is it, to, what, what, what, what would a president do this to? Well, look, I mean, you have to talk about specific areas.

John Judis: I mean, what's the, and again, I don't have any clue about NATO. The Middle East, uh, still a problem off shore balancing I think was, would have been the s the solution. There is this too technical a term instead of a, you know, aligning the United States with the Iran, uh, the Netanyahu government and a, so I mean with Saudi Arabia a Netanyahu, we should, we should, eh, against their ran, we should again, a PR, we should go back to some kind of a balance of power politics in the Middle East where really we're still suffering from this enormous hole created by the, uh, a rock war and where Europe as well. Cause that's again that, where do you think all the terrorism and asylum crises have come in Europe and in the two thousands and there? Yeah. Well, yes, of course. That's, that's, that's part of the same story. And so as so as Libyan, that's it. So, so there's a lot to do in terms of specific foreign policy, but I don't. Okay.

Minton Beddoes: All right, well we'll leave it there and we'll get some, um, questions from the audience and some interventions. Yes. Gentleman in the second row, if you could just wait for the mic would be great.

Speaker 4: Thank you. Corey. Uh, I have a question for you. I agree with you. The Chinese Communist Party, what they're most fearful about. I agree. They've set up a lot of different systems to protect against our liberal western democracy. Now I know you've been a strong advocate of confronting evil when it happens as in Ukraine and Crimea. What would be a more robust foreign policy? Specifically, what policies would you advocate for today? Because I believe the biggest threat to liberal western democracy is China with their development of AI and some of the advantages they have over the west. So what, what specifically, what would you recommend?

Kori Schake: I love that question. Thank you. So my favorite expense of American foreign policy money in the last 20 years was when Governor Huntsman was the Obama administration's ambassador in Beijing. He posted on the website of the US embassy, the air quality index in Beijing and their Chinese government went nuts at added, it cost us about a dollar 50 to do. And it succeeded in forcing the Chinese government into a conversation where they were accountable to their people. Um, we've gotten, as Doug rightly pointed out, we've gotten lazy at old fashioned political warfare, which is we have lots of tools to force the Chinese government to play by the rules of having to often to the standards that we believe and we just need to limber ourselves up and think about how to do that again because we're pretty good at it. When we turn our attention to it, the diabolical creativity of your average American 23 year old is going to be our salvation.

Kori Schake: My, my favorite article ever written on American foreign policy was by James fallows in about 2010 in the Atlantic and he talks about the role of the Jeremiah at in American foreign policy, right? Jeremiah from Torah always believed he was failing God and that's why he was beloved of God. And what the United sex is good at is when we start to realize we're failing. We up our game and I'm reasonably confident that we're going to figure out how to navigate China's rise in ways that create incentives for accountability domestically, for playing by the rules that everybody else plays by. And that at a minimum can contain the worst effects of China. While those moms who want safe baby milk start being demanding political consumers in China.

Douglas Lute: And one thing we should not do is walk away from the Trans Pacific partnership, which was just ridiculous, right? Which now makes the competition with China Mano a Mano between us and China as opposed to a very unfair competitive advantage in RP gap, which would have been 12 like-minded democracies are enforcing standards against China. So we should play, as Korea said, we should play this. This is a team sport and we should appreciate our teammates

Douglas Lute: and we should secure our teams, not disband them.

Kori Schake: Our biggest advantage over China is that others believe that we are on the right side of this argument and will help us. Nobody believes that of China. And we're failing to take advantage of that enormous advantage that we have.

Douglas Lute: Thank you. Yes, lady that,

Speaker 5: hi. I wanted to pick up on the idea that you've suggested that there's a political DNA to countries. And my question has to do with whether or not it's possible that the West can cross pollinate. Uh, we seem to have done it rather successfully. If you consider the fact that as Hobbs put it at one point before the West rose life was nasty, brutish, and short. And now the metrics of human wellbeing where ever the western civilization has spread, including to some extent in places like China and India, metrics of human wellbeing have rose risen, um, uh, greatly. So what's the prospect of continuing to cross pollinate to places that need the western DNA?

Douglas Lute: So, look, I mean, I think we share a common political culture, um, broadly with western Europe. All right. And, and, and that's why we have NATO. That's why we've supported set from the outset the integration of Europe in the European Union. Um, and so that's also why I failed to understand today, why we yell at these, uh, allies in public and why we, why we denigrate their contributions and so forth. Um, you mean the most telling data point for me is that the only time in NATO's history as one of these institutions, right? With common DNA, maybe, um, the only time in its history now over 70 years that it invoked the mutual defense clause. Article Five of the Washington Treaty, right? The NATO treaty was when they came to our assistance the day after nine 11. So on the morning of September 12th, NATO and vote for the only time it's history article five, 18 years later, there are still 40 countries to include our NATO allies working with us in Afghanistan. That's the kind of team I want to be part of. And that's under Kurt girded by common values in, in my, in my language, common DNA, common political DNA. Um,

Kori Schake: I see. I'm a St Louis Cardinals Fan and so baseball analogies come naturally to me very often in American foreign policy. The mistake we make as swinging for the center field fence when what we are actually good at as a political culture is small ball, right? A lead off hitter takes a walk, sacrifice fly to right advance a Sam steal third base side squeeze. There's a cricket analogy. Yeah. And we're really, that's how we're organized as a culture, right? Active civil society, has there ever been better American foreign assistance than the gates foundation helping countries in Africa build sustainable healthcare systems? Um, the rotary clubs scholarship, right? Like flood the zone is actually how we help shape that kind of DNA. A whole bunch of little initiatives that add up to something big and magnificent is a much better way for us to shape the world. So you're going to have to translate that for me afterwards. I have no idea why you should not knowingly, yes. Creston over there,

Speaker 5: gentlemen at the back there. Yeah. Thank you. This has been a conversation largely about China and the 90s and the two thousands and I believe that we're in a bit of a shifting point with China and I would love to hear your perspective on the trade war that's happening now. That's done.

Minton Beddoes: What's your take? Is that, is the trade war a necessary way of changing the game? Well, Huh. Okay.

John Judis: This is another example. Oops. Let me put this, this. Okay. Can you hear me? Yeah, yeah. Um, I, I think, again, this is again another early warning signal with Trump where there was a, there is a real problem in our trade relations with China. It's not a level playing field stealing our various technology secrets and things like that and uh, where he has seized the issue in a way that the United States had to do, but I'm not sure about the methods that he's using in order to accomplish it. I still don't quite understand what we're going to get out of the tariff conflict with China. I mean, as you, you know, from the economics, just changing the trade balance doesn't necessarily make a difference. I mean, the thing that we have to worry about the United States is advanced electronics, high tech where we are in the world in that, uh, and there's, you know, again, there's a big area of competition with China on that.

John Judis: We want them to stop doing a kind of industrial policy. This 20, 25 plan. I don't think they're going to stop. I think a lot of the response to that has to be here in the United States, in our undertaking, that kind of thing. What general goes back to Ronald Reagan and the semiconductors and establishing semi semi tech. Uh, so, you know, again, we have to be vigilant about the relations between government and the economy and inspiring things in our country and keeping them going. And I think that's, that's where a lot of the solutions gonna come. And at the same time we have to again, combat, uh, people are stealing secrets from us. And, uh, you know, again, there might be some, I think the wild way thing, there's a real value there in what doing, but I'm not sure about it and I'm not the, not the person that they give you a final answer on it. Thank you. I think we have time for one last question. Is there a yes gentleman here?

Speaker 5: Uh, I think what's happening with the elbowing between the United States and Russia and China is interesting but deep second place to an economic revolution as we have shifted to a knowledge, uh, revolution. You know, the agricultural revolution was major, the industrial revolution was major. This, this place that we're in has created boom towns across America. From Boston to Nashville, we have two minutes. Okay. You want to know the cities are booming everywhere globally. This is a dynamic shift and politicians are sort of unaware of it and unable to keep up and so they're sort of looking backwards and, and the world's bonding and moving forward or at least parts of it in a very dynamic way. Could you click on that? There was a comment more than a question, but like do you, do you think that,

Kori Schake: I agree we're in the midst of a revolution and free societies have the kind of resilience that helps them adapt much more than unfree societies, which tend to be more brittle and more centrally organized. Can I build on that and just, cause we have one minute left in 20 seconds each. If you answer that and also then tell me when we're back here in another 30 years, is the West still gonna

be still going to be, I'll always still be asking, has the West lost its way? Is the West gonna be a meaningful concept? What's the West going to do?

Douglas Lute: Well, the places you say Boston, Palo Alto, aspen, places like this are prospering. Right? But if you're going to Michigan city, Indiana where I grew up in the rust belt, it's not okay. So, so I think it very much this revolution features the haves and the have nots and that's playing out politically as well because I think that there's really something to these common values. Um, my estimate would be yes, the West is going to be relevant 30 years from now. Go ahead.

Kori Schake: West going to be relevant 30 years from now and no, the West is going to be resurgent 30 years from now and we're going to be celebrating a that Hong Kong and Taiwan pre produced the models that helped China become western. Are you going to leave us on a downbeat note or an upbeat note?

John Judis: The question about the knowledge thing, the, uh, I mean, there, there is a, uh, something, a centripetal force is bringing us together, but at the same time, and again, to repeat don even development of capitalism, Brexit pulling us apart, uh, the rise of a more toxic nationalism that's pulling the countries apart and, you know, recognize various alliances that we've had 30 years, 30 years. I don't think people will be talking about the west.

Minton Beddoes: Well, they be talking about the subject of your next book, socialism.

John Judis: Uh Huh. Maybe I hope, but what? And we also have to see who wins, uh, who's president of the United States in 2024.

Minton Beddoes: Hey, well, on that note, thank you all very much.